Text analytics are often used in the social sciences as a way of unobtrusively observing people and their interactions. Humanists tend to approach the supporting algorithms with skepticism, and with good reason. This post is about the difficulties of using words or counts as a proxy for some secondary or deeper meaning. Although I offer no solutions here, readers of the blog will know I am hopeful of the promise of these sorts of measurements if used appropriately, and right now, we’re still too close to the cutting edge to know exactly what that means. There are, however, copious examples of text analytics used well in the humanities (most recently, for example, Joanna Guldi’s  publication on the history of walking).

The Confusion

Klout is a web service which ranks your social influence based on your internet activity. I don’t know how Klout’s algorithm works (and I doubt they’d be terribly forthcoming if I asked), but one of the products of that algorithm is a list of topics about which you are influential. For instance, Klout believes me to be quite influential with regards to Money (really? I don’t even have any of that.) and Journalism (uhmm.. no.), somewhat influential in Juggling (spot on.), Pizza (I guess I am from New York…), Scholarship (Sure!), and iPads (I’ve never touched an iPad.), and vaguely influential on the topic of Cars (nope) and Mining (do they mean text mining?).

By Ildar Sagdejev (Specious) (Own work) [GFDL (www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html) or CC-BY-SA-3.0-2.5-2.0-1.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

My pizza expertise is clear.

Thankfully careers don’t ride on this measurement (we have other metrics for that), but the danger is still fairly clear: the confusion of vocabulary and syntax for semantics and pragmatics. There are clear layers between the written word and its intended meaning, and those layers often depend on context and prior knowledge. Further, regardless of the intended meaning of the author, how her words are interpreted in the larger world can vary wildly. She may talk about money and pizza until she is blue in the face, but if the whole world disagrees with her, that is no measurement of expertise nor influence (even if angry pizza-lovers frequently shout at her about her pizza opinions).

We see very simple examples of this in sentiment  analysis, a way to extract the attitude of the writer toward whatever it was he’s written. An old friend who recently dipped his fingers in sentiment analysis wrote this:

According to his algorithm, that sentence was a positive one. Unless I seriously misunderstand my social cues (which I suppose wouldn’t be too unlikely), I very much doubt the intended positivity of the author. However, most decent algorithms would pick up that this was a tweet from somebody who was positive about Sarah Jessica Parker.

Unobtrusive Measurements

This particular approach to understanding humans belongs to the larger methodological class of unobtrusive measurements. Generally speaking, this topic is discussed in the context of the social sciences and is contrasted with more ‘obtrusive’ measurements along the lines of interviews or sticking people in labs. Historians generally don’t need to talk about unobtrusive measurements because, hey, the only way we could be obtrusive to our subjects would require exhuming bodies. It’s the idea that you can cleverly infer things about people from a distance, without them knowing that they are being studied.

Notice the disconnect between what I just said, and the word itself. ‘Unobtrusive’ against “without them knowing that they are being studied.” These are clearly not the same thing, and that distinction between definition and word is fairly important – and not merely in the context of this discussion. One classic example (Doob and Gross, 1968) asks how somebody’s social status determines whether someone might take aggressive action against them. They specifically measures a driver’s likelihood to honk his horn in frustration based on the perceived social status of the driver in front of them. Using a new luxury car and an old rusty station wagon, the researchers would stop at traffic lights that had turned green and would wait to see whether the car behind them honked. In the end, significantly more people honked at the low status car. More succinctly: status affects decisions of aggression.  Honking and the perceived worth of the car were used as proxies for aggression and perceptions of status, much like vocabulary is used as a proxy for meaning.

In no world would this be considered unobtrusive from the subject’s point of view. The experimenters intruded on their world, and their actions and lives changed because of it. All it says is that the subjects won’t change their behavior based on the knowledge that they are being studied. However, when an unobtrusive experiment becomes large enough, even one as innocuous as counting words, even that advantage no longer holds. Take, for example, citation analysis and the h-index. Citation analysis was initially construed as an unobtrusive measurement; we can say things about scholars and scholarly communication by looking at their citation patterns rather than interviewing them directly. However, now that entire nations (like Australia or the UK) use quantitative analysis to distribute funding to scholarship, the measurements are no longer unobtrusive. Scholars know how the new scholarly economy works, and have no problem changing their practices to get tenure, funding, etc.

The Measurement and The Effect: Untested Proxies

A paper was recently published (O’Boyle Jr. and Aguinis, 2012) on the non-normality of individual performance. The idea is that we assume that people’s performance (for example students in a classroom) are normally distributed along a bell curve. A few kids get really good grades, a few kids get really bad grades, but most are ‘C’ students. The authors challenge this view, suggesting performance takes on more of a power-law distribution, where very few people perform very well, and the majority perform very poorly, with 80% of people performing worse than the statistical average. If that’s hard to imagine, it’s because people are trained to think of averages on a bell curve, where 50% are greater than average and 50% are worse than average. Instead, imagine one person gets a score of 100, and another five people get scores of 10. The average is (100 + (10 * 5)) / 6 = 25, which means five out of the six people performed worse than average.

It’s an interesting hypothesis, and (in my opinion) probably a correct one, but their paper does not do a great job showing that. The reason is (you guessed it) they use scores as a proxy for performance.  For example, they look at the number of published papers individuals have in top-tier journals, and show that some authors are very productive whereas most are not. However, it’s a fairly widely-known phenomena that in science, famous names are more likely to be published than obscure ones (there are many anecdotes about anonymous papers being rejected until the original, famous author is revealed, at which point the paper is magically accepted). The number of accepted papers may be as much a proxy for fame as it is for performance, so the results do not support their hypothesis. The authors then look at awards given to actors and writers, however those awards suffer the same issues: the more well-known an actor, the the more likely they’ll be used in good movies, the more likely they’ll be visible to award-givers, etc. Again, awards are not a proxy for the quality of a performance. The paper then goes on to measure elected officials based on votes in elections. I don’t think I need to go on about how votes might not map one-to-one on the performance and prowess of an elected official.

I blogged a review of the most recent culturomics paper, which used google ngrams to look at the frequency of recurring natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, etc.) vs. the frequency of recurring social events (war, unemployment, etc.). The paper concludes that, because of differences in the frequency of word-use for words like ‘war’ or ‘earthquake’, the phenomena themselves are subject to different laws. The authors use word frequency as a proxy for the frequency of the events themselves, much in the same way that Klout seems to measure influence based on word-usage and counting. The problem, of course, is that the processes which govern what people decide to write down do not enjoy a one-to-one relationship to what people experience. Using words as proxies for events is just as problematic as using them for proxies of expertise, influence, or performance. The underlying processes are simply far more complicated than these algorithms give them credit for.

It should be noted, however, that the counts are not meaningless; they just don’t necessarily work as proxies for what these ngram scholars are trying to measure. Further, although the underlying processes are quite complex, the effect size of social or political pressure on word-use may be negligible to the point that their hypothesis is actually correct. The point isn’t that one cannot use one measurement as a proxy for something else; rather, the effectiveness of that proxy is assumed rather than actually explored or tested in any way. We need to do a better job, especially as humanists, of figuring out exactly how certain measurements map onto effects we seek.

A beautiful case study that exemplifies this point was written by famous statistician Andrew Gelman, and it aims to use unobtrusive and indirect measurements to find alien attacks and zombie outbreaks. He uses Google Trends to show that the number of zombies in the world are growing at a frightening rate.

Zombies will soon take over!

 

 

Every once in a while, a new project comes around bearing a message loud and clear: this is a sign of things to come. ORBIS, the Stanford Geospatial Network Model of the Roman World, is one such project.

ORBIS was created by Walter Scheidel, Elijah Meeks, and a host of others. At the very beginning, I should point out I am not a classicist. The below review is of the nature rather than the content of ORBIS as a scholarly product.

Roman Travel Network

ORBIS is many things but, most simply, it is an interface allowing researchers to experience the geography of the Roman world from an ancient perspective. The executive summary: given any two cities in the ancient world, it returns the fastest, cheapest, or shortest route between them, given the month, the mode of transportation, and various other options. It’s Google Maps for the ancient world, complete with the “Avoid Highways” feature.

I was among the lucky few to see an early version of the tool, and after sending back an informal review, Elijah Meeks invited me to review the site publicly via my blog. The first section explains what I feel is the most important contribution of ORBIS to the Digital Humanities; it is a reflexive tool that allows the humanist to engage with the process as well as the product. I then highlight some of the cool features, and finally list some rough edges and desiderata for future iterations or similar projects.

Tool As Argument

Beyond being an exceptionally well-made and useful tool, it is not the tool itself which makes ORBIS stand out. Walter Scheidel and Elijah Meeks could have posted the automated map portion of the site by itself, and it would have garnered deserving praise, but they went well beyond that goal; they made a reflexive tool.

ORBIS is among the first digital scholarly tools for the humanities (that I have encountered) that really lives up to the name “digital scholarly tool for the humanities.” Beyond being a simple tool, ORBIS is an explicit and transparent argument, a way of presenting research that also happens to allow, by its very existence, further research to be done. It is a map that allows the user to engage in the process of map-making, and a presentation of a process that allows the user to make and explore in ways the initial creators could not have foreseen. Of course, as with any project there are a few rough edges and desired features, which I’ll get into further down below.

Elevation data to help model the difficulty in getting from one place to another.

Along with the map, the Makers of this project (by which I mean authors, developers, data gatherers, …) present a fairly interactive documentary of the map-making process, including historical accounts, data sources, algorithmic explanations, visual aids, downloadable data, and a forthcoming API. They built an explicit model of the ancient world, taking into account roads and rivers, oceans and coastlines, weather and geographic features, various modes of transportation for civilian and military purposes, and put it all together so any researcher can sit down and figure out how long it would have taken, or how expensive it would have been, to travel between 751 locations in the ancient Roman world. Rather than asking us to trust that their data are accurate, the makers revealed their model – their underlying argument – for critique and extension.

Exploring the Ancient World

The ORBIS model includes 751 sites covering about 4 million square miles of ancient space, including over 50,000 miles of road or desert tracks, nearly 20,000 miles of navigable rivers and canals, and almost 1,000 sea routes between sea ports. As I mentioned earlier, the model works like Google Maps; given two locations, it tells you the cheapest, shortest, or fastest route between them. These calculations take into account the time-of-year and usual weather, elevation changes between sites, fourteen modes of travel (ox cart, foot, army on march, camel caravan, etc.), river travel (including extra difficulty moving upstream), etc.

The ORBIS Interface

Another exciting feature on ORBIS is the distance cartogram. This visualization reveals the impact of travel speed and transport prices on overall connectivity; it allows the researcher to see how far other cities were with respect to a certain core city (for instance Constantinople) from the perspective of cost and travel time rather than mere geographical distance. This feature brings the researcher closer to the actual ancient Roman experience. A larger insight is revealed when taking a “distant reading” approach to the cartogram: “Distance cartograms show that due to massive cost differences between aquatic and terrestrial modes of transport, peripheries were far more remote from the center in terms of price than in terms of time.”

Constantinople Cartogram

Desiderata

ORBIS is a big step forward in designing digital scholarly objects for the digital humanities. It is a tool that is both useful and reflexive, offering engagement with both process and product. It also exemplifies an increasingly popular mode of scholarly communication: the published online object. Because the mode is still (even after decades of online DH projects) not quite solidified, ORBIS lacks a few of the basic features of common scholarly communication, and by straddling both the new and the old, ORBIS doesn’t quite live up to the best qualities of either digital or analog publication.

First of all, although their team sent a preliminary version of the site out to many people, it never went through any formal review process. Readers of this blog will know that I am no advocate of traditional publication systems or the antiquated marriage of publication and peer-review, but at this point it is worth noting that ORBIS (to my knowledge) has only been reviewed informally, by sympathetic reviewers like myself. Perhaps this means that adoption of the tool should be approached with greater caution until it is more formally reviewed by a post-publication periodical like the Journal of Digital Humanities.

That being said, the site does try remain true to humanistic and traditional publication roots. A paper version is in the works, and it is written such that we researchers can engage in the process of the tool. Unfortunately, it perhaps stays a bit too true to the paper model. The site is designed to read top-to-bottom, left-to-right, and none of the internal references to other sections include links to aid in navigation. Further, if the intent is to simultaneously allow exploration of the tool and its creation, the design does not realize this goal. The map appears at “the end” of the site, all the way on the right, and because of the layout, it is impossible to view it alongside the text describing it without opening a new window. There is quite a bit of white space to the right of the text on my wide-screen monitor – perhaps a smaller version of the tool can be embedded in that space.

One of the strengths of the project is the explicit nature of its creation. Data can be downloaded, and the sources, provenance, algorithms, and technologies are clearly stated. The model as an argument is, in short, visible and comprehensible even to those with little prior knowledge on these technologies. What this does is bridge the gap between code and humanistic inquiry, adding levels of model explication and tool-use between them. ORBIS is by far not the first project to make the creation of a tool explicit, but usually that explication is simply a public posting of the code and some limited comments or descriptions of how that code works. Unfortunately, although ORBIS does include a better bridge to explicate its argument, it does not offer the code. It’s a bit like David Copperfield explaining how he made the Statue of Liberty disappear; the explanation would certainly be helpful, but if he really wanted other people to be able to create similar illusions, he’d offer up the materials as well. (Alright, the metaphor doesn’t completely work, but stick with it.) The digital humanities seems finally to be getting into code sharing, and this is a good thing. The cost for sharing code is essentially free (although there’s a much greater price for sharing good code – all the extra time spent marking it up and making it pretty), and the benefits should go without saying: More things like ORBIS, much faster. Better tools built collectively and suiting all our individual needs.

The last, most important, and most difficult of my desires deals with uncertainty. There’s been a lot of talk about data uncertainty in the humanities lately, not least of which stemming from Stanford, the home university of ORBIS. It’s a difficult problem to solve, but presented as it is, the ORBIS project lends itself to the varieties of critiques common in the work of Johanna Drucker and others. How do you know that these were the shortest routes? What about missing information? What about the fact that every bit of travel was its own experience, with different human and environmental factors playing in, perhaps delays for sick relatives or mutineering seamen? These questions are swept under the table when ORBIS presents one route and one set of numbers per query: here, this is the fastest route, these are the cities, this is how much it would cost. The visualization and end-products create an illusion of certainty in the data, although in the text, the makers are quick to point out that a researcher should not take it as certain. One solution, and this extends to all data-driven DH projects, is to model uncertainty in the data from the ground up. How much more certain is one route than another? How certain are you of the weather in one location compared to the weather elsewhere? This sort of information flows naturally into models of Bayesian data analysis, and would allow ORBIS to deliver a list of credible routes, revealing which parts of those routes are more or less certain, and including other information like the probability of a ship being lost at sea on a particular route. Of course, data uncertainty is only part of the problem, and this would only be a partial solution.

This isn’t the place to detail exactly how uncertainty should be modeled in the data, and exactly what ought to be done with it, but the fact is there is already rich knowledge in the model and in the data available dealing with the uncertainty of travel, but that information disappears as soon as it is presented in the map interface. If ORBIS represents the next step in humanities tool production, it doesn’t quite (yet) live up to the promise of humanities data analysis, impressive as their analysis is. There is still not yet a clear enough representation of uncertainty and interpretation to reach that goal. To be fair, I’ve yet to see a single project living up to that promise at anything close to large-scale; the tools just haven’t been developed yet. Perhaps that promise is impossible at large scale, although I certainly hope that is not the case.

The View From Here

Despite my long list of rough edges and desiderata, I still stand by my statement that this tool is an exemplar of a shift in digital humanities projects. The tool itself is profoundly impressive and will prove useful for a variety of research, but what stands out from the humanities standpoint is the explicit nature of the ORBIS underbelly. It blurs the line between tool and argument. There are other profoundly impressive and useful tools out there (topic modeling comes to mind). However, with topic modeling, the assumptions are still obscure to the unfamiliar, despite my own best efforts and the even better efforts of others. This is because the software topic modeling is packaged with, the software we use to run the analyses, does not simultaneously engage in the process of its own creation in the way that ORBIS does. Going forward, I predict the most used (or at least the most useful) digital tools for humanists will include that engagement, rather than existing as black boxes out of which results spring forth, fully armed and ready to battle as Athena from Zeus’s forehead. ORBIS is by no means the first to attempt such a feat but, I think, it is as-yet the most successful.

 

 

Warning: This post is potentially evil, and definitely normative. While I am unsure whether what I describe below should be doneI’m becoming increasingly certain that it could be. Read with caution.

Complex Adaptive Systems

Science is a complex adaptive system. It is a constantly evolving network of people and ideas and artifacts which interact with and feed back on each other to produce this amorphous socio-intellectual entity we call science. Science is also a bunch of nested complex adaptive systems, some overlapping, and is itself part of many other systems besides.

The study of complex interactions is enjoying a boom period due to the facilitating power of the “information age.” Because any complex system, whether it be a social group or a pool of chemicals, can exist in almost innumerable states while comprising the same constituent parts, it requires massive computational power to comprehend all the many states a system might find itself in. From the other side, it takes a massive amount of data observation and collection to figure out what states systems eventually do find themselves in, and that knowledge of how complex systems play out in the real world relies on collective and automated data gathering. From seeing how complex systems work in reality, we can infer properties of their underlying mechanisms; by modeling those mechanisms and computing the many possibilities they might allow, we can learn more about ourselves and our place in the larger multisystem. 1

One of the surprising results of complexity theory is that seemingly isolated changes can produce rippling, massive effects throughout a system.  Only a decade after the removal of big herbivores like giraffes and elephants from an African savanna, a generally positive relationship between bugs and plants turned into an antagonistic one. Because the herbivores no longer grazed on certain trees, those trees began producing less nectar and fewer thorns, which in turn caused cascading repercussions throughout the ecosystem. Ultimately, the trees’ mortality rate doubled, and a variety of species were worse-off than they had been. 2 Similarly, the introduction of an invasive species can cause untold damage to an ecosystem, as has become abundantly clear in Florida 3 and around the world (the extinction of flightless birds in New Zealand springs to mind).

http://www.flickr.com/photos/arnolouise/3202569865/

Both evolutionary and complexity theories show that self-organizing systems evolve in such a way that they are self-sustaining and self-perpetuating. Often, within a given context or environment, the systems which are most resistant to attack, or the most adaptable to change, are the most likely to persist and grow. Because the entire environment evolves concurrently, small changes in one subsystem tend to propagate as small changes in many others. However, when the constraints of the environment change rapidly (like with the introduction of an asteroid and a cloud of sun-cloaking dust), when a new and sufficiently foreign system is introduced (land predators to New Zealand), or when an important subsystem is changed or removed (the loss of megafauna in Africa), devastating changes ripple outward.

An environmental ecosystem is one in which many smaller overlapping systems exist, and changes in the parts may change the whole; society can be described similarly. Students of history know that the effects of one event (a sinking ship, an assassination, a terrorist attack) can propagate through society for years or centuries to come. However, a system not merely a slave to these single occurrences which cause Big Changes. The structure and history of a system implies certain stable, low energy states. We often anthropomorphize the tendency of systems to come to a stable mean, for example “nature abhors a vacuum.” This is just the manifestation of the second law of thermodynamics: entropy always increases, systems naturally tend toward low energy states.

For the systems of society, they are historically structured constrained in such a way that certain changes would require very little energy (an assassination leading to war in a world already on the brink), whereas others would require quite a great deal (say, an attempt to cause war between Canada and the U.S.). It is a combination of the current structural state of a system and the interactions of the constituent parts that lead that system in one direction or another. Put simply, a society, its people, and its environment are responsible for its future. Not terribly surprising, I know, but the formal framework of complexity theory is a useful one for what is described below.

metastability

The above picture, from the Wikipedia article on metastability, provides an example of what’s described above. The ball is resting in a valley, a low energy state, and a small change may temporarily excite the system, but the ball eventually finds its way into the same, or another, low energy state. When the environment is stable, its subsystems tend to find comfortably stable niches as well. Of course, I’m not sure anyone would call society wholly stable…

Science as a System

Science (by which I mean wissenschaft, any systematic research) is part of society, and itself includes many constituent and overlapping parts. I recently argued, not without precedent, that the correspondence network between early modern Europeans facilitated the rapid growth of knowledge we like to call the Scientific Revolution. Further, that network was an inevitable outcome of socio/political/technological factors, including shrinking transportation costs, increasing political unrest leading to scholarly displacement, and, very simply, an increased interest in communicating once communication proved so fruitful. The state of the system affected the parts, the parts in turn affected the system, and a growing feedback loop led to the co-causal development of a massive communication network and a period of massively fruitful scholarly work.

Scientific Correspondence Network

Today and in the past, science is embedded in, and occasionally embodied by, the various organizational and communicative hierarchies its practitioners find themselves in. The people, ideas, and products of science feed back on one another. Scientists are perhaps more affected by their labs, by the process of publication, by the realities of funding, than they might admit. In return, the knowledge and ideas produced by science, the message, shape and constrain the medium in which they are propagated. I’ve often heard and read two opposing views: that knowledge is True and Right  and unaffected the various social goings on of those who produce it, and that knowledge is Constructed and Meaningless outside of the social and linguistic system it resides in. The truth, I’m sure, is a complex tangle somewhere between the two, and affected by both.

In either case, science does not take place in a vacuum. We do our work through various media and with various funds, in departments and networks and (sometimes) lab-coats, using a slew of carefully designed tools and a language that was not, in general, made for this purpose. In short, we and our work exist in a  complex system.

Engineering the Academy

That system is changing. Michael Nielsen’s recent book 4 talks about the rise of citizen science, augmented intelligence, and collaborative systems as not merely as ways to do what we’ve already done faster, but as new methods of discovery. The ability to coordinate on such a scale, and in such new ways, changes the game of science. It changes the system.

While much of these changes are happening automatically, in a self-organized sort of way, Nielsen suggests that we can learn from our past and learn from other successful collective ventures in order to make a “design science of collaboration.” That is, using what we know of how people work together best, of what spurs on the most inspired research and the most interesting results, we can design systems to facilitate collaboration and scientific research. In Nielsen’s case, he’s talking mostly about computer systems; how can we design a website or an algorithm or a technological artifact that will aid in scientific discovery, using the massive distributed power of the information age? One way Nielson points out is “designed serendipity,” creating an environment where scientists are more likely experience serendipitous occurrences, and thus more likely to come up with innovated and unexpected ideas.

Can we engineer science? http://www.flickr.com/photos/seattlemunicipalarchives/4818952324

In complexity terms, this idea is restructuring the system in such a way that the constituent parts or subsystems will be or do “better,” however we feel like defining better in this situation. It’s definitely not the first time an idea like this has been used. For example, science policy makers, government agencies, and funding bodies have long known that science will often go where the money is. If there is a lot of money available to research some particular problem, then that problem will tend to get researched. If the main funding requires research funded to become open access, by and large that will happen (NIH’s PubMed requirements).

There are innumerable ways to affect the system in a top-down way in order to shape its future. Terrence Deacon writes about how it is the constraints on a system which tend it toward some equilibrium state 5; by shaping the structure of the scientific system, we can predictably shape its direction. That is, we can artificially create a low energy state (say, open access due to policy and funding changes), and let the constituent parts find their way into that low energy state eventually, reaching equilibrium. I talked a bit more about this idea of constraints leading a system in a recent post.

As may be recalled from the discussion above, however, this is not the only way to affect a complex system. External structural changes are only part of the story of how a system grows shifts, but only a small part of the story. Because of the series of interconnected feedback loops that embody a system’s complexity, small changes can (and often do) propagate up and change the system as a whole. Lie, Slotine, and Barabási recently began writing about the “controllability of complex networks 6,”  suggesting ways in which changing or controlling constituent parts of a complex system can reliably and predictably change the entire system, perhaps leading it toward a new preferred low energy state. In this case, they were talking about the importance of well-connected hubs in a network; adding or removing them in certain areas can deeply affect the evolution of that network, no matter the constraints. Watts recounts a great example of how a small power outage rippled into a national disaster because just the right connections were overloaded and removed 7. The strategic introduction or removal of certain specific links in the scientific system may go far toward changing the system itself.

Not only is science is a complex adaptive system, it is a system which is becoming increasingly well-understood. A century of various science studies combined with the recent appearance of giant swaths of data about science and scientists themselves is beginning to allow us to learn the structure and mechanisms of the scientific system. We do not, and will never, know the most intricate details of that system, however in many cases and for many changes, we only need to know general properties of a system in order to change it in predictable ways. If society feels a certain state of science is better than others, either for the purpose of improved productivity or simply more control, we are beginning to see which levers we need to pull in order to enact those changes.

This is dangerous. We may be able to predict first order changes, but as they feed back onto second order, third order, and further-down-the-line changes, the system becomes more unpredictable. Changing one thing positively may affect other aspects in massively negative (and massively unpredictable) ways.

However, generally if humans can do something, we will. I predict the coming years will bring a more formal Science Systems Engineering, a specialty apart from science policy which will attempt to engineer the direction of scientific research from whatever angle possible. My first post on this blog concerned a concept I dubbed scientonomy, which was just yet another attempt at unifying everybody who studies science in a meta sort of way. In that vocabulary, then, this science systems engineering would be an applied scientonomy. We have countless experts in all aspects of how science works on a day-to-day basis from every angle; that expertise may soon become much more prominent in application.

It is my hope and belief that a more formalized way of discussing and engineering scientific endeavors, either on the large scale or the small, can lead to benefits to humankind in the long run. I share the optimism of Michael Nielsen in thinking that we can design ways to help the academy run more smoothly and to lead it toward a more thorough, nuanced, and interesting understanding of whatever it is being studied. However, I’m also aware of the dangers of this sort of approach, first and foremost being disagreement on what is “better” for science or society.

At this point, I’m just putting this idea out there to hear the thoughts of my readers. In my meatspace day-to-day interactions, I tend to be around experimental scientists and quantitative social scientists who in general love the above ideas,  but at my heart and on my blog I feel like a humanist, and these ideas worry me for all the obvious reasons (and even some of the more obscure ones). I’d love to get some input, especially from those who are terrified that somebody could even think this is possible.

Notes:

  1. I’m coining the term “multisystem” because ecosystem is insufficient, and I don’t know something better. By multisystem, I mean any system of systems; specifically here, the universe and how it evolves. If you’ve got a better term that invokes that concept, I’m all for using it. Cosmos comes to mind, but it no longer represents “order,” a series of interlocking systems, in the way it once did.
  2. Palmer, Todd M, Maureen L Stanton, Truman P Young, Jacob R Goheen, Robert M Pringle, and Richard Karban. 2008. “Breakdown of an Ant-Plant Mutualism Follows the Loss of Large Herbivores from an African Savanna.” Science319 (5860) (January 11): 192–195. doi:10.1126/science.1151579.
  3. Gordon, Doria R. 1998. “Effects of Invasive, Non-Indigenous Plant Species on Ecosystem Processes: Lessons From Florida.” Ecological Applications 8 (4): 975–989. doi:10.1890/1051-0761(1998)008[0975:EOINIP]2.0.CO;2.
  4. Nielsen, Michael. Reinventing Discovery: The New Era of Networked Science. Princeton University Press, 2011.
  5. Deacon, Terrence W. “Emergence: The Hole at the Wheel’s Hub.” In The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion, edited by Philip Clayton and Paul Davies. Oxford University Press, USA, 2006.
  6. Liu, Yang-Yu, Jean-Jacques Slotine, and Albert-László Barabási. “Controllability of Complex Networks.” Nature473, no. 7346 (May 12, 2011): 167–173.
  7. Watts, Duncan J. Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age. 1st ed. W. W. Norton & Company, 2003.
 
Halting Conditions

Occasionally, in computer science, the term “halting condition” is thrown around as the point at which the program should stop running. Say I’ve got a robot that watches my roommate and I play scrabble, and I want it to count how many scrabble pieces we use, and tell us who won and what the highest [...]

 
The Internet Listens

The public science blogosphere has recently been buzzing about an online edited book review called Download The Universe. The twist is that the editors only review online-only science books, and their definition of “book” is broadly construed: [W]e define ebooks broadly. They may be self-published pdf manuscripts. They may be Kindle Singles about science. They can [...]

 
More heavy-handed culturomics

A few days ago, Gao, Hu, Mao, and Perc posted a preprint of their forthcoming article comparing social and natural phenomena. The authors, apparently all engineers and physicists, use the google ngrams data to come to the conclusion that “social and natural phenomena are governed by fundamentally different processes.” The take-home message is that words describing [...]

 
The Networked Structure of Scientific Growth

Well, it looks like Digital Humanities Now scooped me on posting my own article. As some of you may have read, I recently did not submit a paper on the Republic of Letters, opting instead to hold off until I could submit it to a journal which allowed authorial preprint distribution. Preprints are a vital [...]

 
On Keeping Pledges

A few months back, I posted a series of pledges about being a good scholarly citizen. Among other things, I pledged to keep my data and code open whenever possible, and to fight to retain the right to distribute materials pending and following their publication. I also signed the Open Access Pledge. Since then, a [...]

 
Flow and Empty Space

Thirty spokes unite in one nave and on that which is non-existent [on the hole in the nave] depends the wheel’s utility. Clay is moulded into a vessel and on that which is non-existent [on its hollowness] depends the vessel’s utility. By cutting out doors and windows we build a house and on that which [...]

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